The Schnepper Trust: Eliminating the Section 306 Taint by Schnepper, J. A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1976
The Schnepper Trust: Eliminating the Section 306
Taint
J. A. Schnepper
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review
by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. A. Schnepper, The Schnepper Trust: Eliminating the Section 306 Taint, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 63 (1976)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol31/iss1/5
THE SCHNEPPER TRUST: ELIMINATING THE SECTION 306
TAINT
J. A. SCHNEPPER*
In order to prevent the distribution of corporate income in the
form of preferred stock which, upon sale by the distributee, would
otherwise qualify for capital gains treatment, section 306 of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that all such stock is tainted at
the time of distribution, and that any gain upon sale is taxed as
ordinary income. The author suggests a method by which such
taint can be removed, and income received upon sale taxed at
capital gain rates. This method entails putting the 306 stock in a
trust along with potentially appreciable property. When the trust
sells the subsequently appreciated property and realizes a capital
gain, it makes a distribution in kind of the 306 stock. As such,
the stock's basis in the hands of the beneficiary is determined by
reference to its fair market value, and the taint is thus purged.
The role of a tax advisor is to plan for potential tax problems
before they arise. His optimal objective is the complete avoidance
of taxation, or, if this is not obtainable, the minimization of his
client's future taxes.' One way the advisor seeks to do this is by
converting fully taxable ordinary income into tax advantaged capi-
tal gains.' Assuming a taxpayer-client is in an upper income bracket
and runs his own business in corporate form, such conversion of
ordinary income into capital gains may be attempted through cer-
tain dividend distributions. For simplicity it is assumed further that
the client is the sole shareholder.
If a shareholder receives a cash dividend on his common stock
it is fully taxable as ordinary income to the extent of corporate
* Professor of Economics, Rutgers College, New Brunswick, N.J.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ken Joyce for his assistance in the
preparation of this paper.
1. Judge Learned Hand stated: "Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall
be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury;
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809,
810 (2d Cir. 1934).
2. Individual ordinary income tax rates range from 14 percent to 70 percent. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1. Generally, only one-half of net long term capital gains are includable in
gross income, thus the maximum tax rate on such income is 35 percent. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1202. The first $50,000 of long term capital gains received in a tax year is taxable at
a maximum rate of 25 percent. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201(b).
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earnings and profits.' If he receives a stock dividend in the form of
additional common shares, he is not taxed upon distribution.' How-
ever, as he owned the whole pie before and after distribution, all he
has accomplished is to cut it into smaller pieces. If he then sells the
new stock dividend shares, he has in effect done nothing more than
sell part of his original ownership equity with a corresponding loss
of control and potential future gains. While the taxable effect of the
sale would be capital gains, the intermediate step of declaring the
stock dividends would have been futile.
What the corporate shareholder is attempting to do is to take
cash out of his company and have it taxed at capital gain rates,
while not giving up any of his ownership of the corporation. There-
fore, he might distribute to himself a dividend of preferred rather
than common stock. Such a distribution would be protected from
taxation at that point,5 and the new preferred shares would get an
allocable pro rata basis from the original common stock.' Since the
shareholder wants cash, not new stock, he could sell the preferred
stock to a bank, insurance company, or other investor under a plan
to have the stock redeemed by the corporation. A sale of preferred
stock normally would be taxed at capital gain rates. This is the
classic preferred stock bail-out, where an attempt is made by a
shareholder to take cash out of his corporation at capital gain rates,
and yet retain full control by using preferred rather than common
stock.
Prior to the 1954 Code, such preferred stock bail-outs were a
court approved device by which earnings and profits could be ex-
tracted from a corporation, and taxes paid at capital gain rather
than ordinary rates.' In 1954 Congress moved to plug this loophole
by the enactment of section 306.8
Section 306(c)(1)(A) provides that preferred stock received as
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301.
4. Id. § 305(a).
5. Id.
6. Id. § 307(a).
7. In Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
918 (1954), decided under the 1939 code, the court specifically validated this type of bail-out
even though the corporation initially had no preferred stock outstanding, and there was a
prearranged plan for its sale and retirement over a period of 7 years.
8. Section 306 provides that a stock dividend, other than common stock issued with
respect to common stock, which meets one of the definitions of § 306(c) is classified as "§
306 stock" and is taxed as ordinary income upon sale or other disposition (other than a
redemption) in accordance with § 306(a). Two of those definitions (§ 306(c)(1)(A) and §
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a dividend on common is to be classified as "section 306 stock"
because the distribution was not includable in the shareholder's
gross income by reason of section 305(a).1 When this preferred stock
is distributed, it becomes tainted. If and when it is sold, the full
amount realized by the shareholder may be taxable as ordinary gain
from the sale of a non-capital asset to the extent of earnings and
profits in the corporation, measured as of the year the stock was
distributed and limited by the fair market value of the preferred
stock at the time of distribution. Any excess over such earnings and
profits and the stock's adjusted basis may be taxed at capital gain
rates. I"
Therefore the shareholder's attempted preferred stock bail-out
of cash at capital gain rates would fail. Worse still, had he taken a
straight cash dividend, that dividend would have reduced the corpo-
ration's earnings and profits" and would have given the shareholder
an additional $100 exclusion for dividends received. 2 As the sale of
the section 306 stock is treated as a sale of a noncapital asset, it
neither reduces the corporation's earnings and profits, nor qualifies
for the dividends received exclusion.
The shareholder therefore may try a new tactic by giving the
preferred stock to his son to sell to an investor. Unfortunately, this
too will fail. Since the stock was received as a gift, the son's basis
under section 1015 is that of his father (donor's basis). 3 Under
section 306(c)(1)(C), Congress has dictated that the section 306
taint remains whenever the preferred stock is transferred to some-
one whose basis is determined by reference to the original share-
holder's basis."
306(c)(1)(C)) are discussed infra. Section 306(c)(1)(B) (dealing with tax free reorganizations)
is not relevant to this discussion.
Note that § 306(c)(2) provides an additional exception not relevant here where a corpora-
tion has no earnings and profits at the time of distribution.
9. Section 305(a) provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, "gross in-
come does not include the amount of any distribution of the stock of a corporation made by
such corporation to its shareholders with respect to its stock."
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 306(a)(1). Note that a redemption of § 306 stock is treated
differently. In that case, the entire amount paid for it is treated as a dividend under § 301.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(a).
12. Id. § 116(a).
13. Id. § 1015(a).
14. Note that § 306(c)(1)(A) only applies where the sale, disposition, or redemption was
effected by the person to whom the § 306 stock was originally distributed whereas § 306(c)
(1)(C) applies to any person holding stock with a substituted basis.
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The corresponding Regulations go on to specifically eliminate
from the section 306(c)(1)(C) definition of 306 stock, that stock the
basis of which "is determined by reference to its fair market value
on the date of the decedent-stockholder's death . . . under section
1014." 1' This does the shareholder little good where he desires to
purge the taint prior to his death.
Beyond this exception, however, neither the Code nor the Regu-
lations specifically refer to other situations where the basis of pre-
viously tainted 306 stock is no longer determined by reference to the
basis of 306 stock. Presumably, such other situations do not give rise
to 306 stock since they are not so defined in section 306 (c)(1)(C)
(nor, for that matter, in section 306(c)(1)(A) nor (B)).'6
The subject of this paper is a suggestion of such a situation, and
its possible use in tax planning, by which section 306 stock may be
purged of its taint, thus allowing disposition and taxation at capital
gain rates and other benefits.
The tax advisor might suggest the use of a Schnepper Trust"7
to solve his client's problem. Assume that section 306 preferred
stock with an adjusted basis of $25, along with other potentially
appreciable property," is transferred to a short term trust which is
irrevocable for' more than 10 years so as to qualify under section
673(a). 9 The grantor's son would be the income beneficiary with the
father having a reversionary interest.
Assume that after a period of time, the potentially appreciable
property does appreciate from $50 to $150. The trust then sells this
non-306 propertya which results in a capital gain of $100. Assuming
the trust agreement so provides, and gives the trustee the power to
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(e) (1960).
16. For example, where a donee sells § 306 stock at a loss, and the basis was greater than
the fair market value at the date of the gift, his basis is the fair market value at the date of
the gift and, therefore, not determined "by reference to the basis . ..of § 306 stock" as
defined in § 306(c)(1)(C). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015(a).
17. Named after Simon Schnepper PBR (Ret.) of West Palm Beach, Florida.
18. These are certain types of property which are almost certain to appreciate and
produce long term capital gains on their sale. Quality corporate or Treasury deep discount
(not original discount) bonds are an example. The realization of the discount on either sale
or maturity will produce capital gains. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(a).
19. The transfer of income producing property to a trust may result in gift taxes under
§ 2511. The desired removal of § 306 taint can also be achieved by use of an irrevocable trust.
20. One must be careful, though, to avoid a sale potentially characterized as a prear-
ranged disposition, or the gain could be attributed to our original shareholder (father) with a
possible retention of the § 306 taint.
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make such distributions, the trustee may then make a distribution
in kind of the preferred stock, which has a fair market value of
$100,1 to the income beneficiary. The trust gets a distribution de-
duction of $10022 and therefore pays no taxes. The capital gain on
the sale is passed through and reported by the income beneficiary. 3
Even more importantly, the basis of the preferred stock in the
hands of the beneficiary is determined by reference to its fair market
value,24 rather than a substituted basis determined by reference to
the donor. Therefore, $75 of capital gain is completely avoided" and
the preferred stock has lost its section 306 taint! In effect, by laun-
dering the preferred stock through the distributable net income of
the trust, the beneficiary has taken cash out of his father's corpora-
tion without paying a tax on the built-in appreciation. Furthermore,
when the cash left in the trust is either distributed to the beneficiary
or remainderman, no tax consequences will result as there is no trust
income.
In order for this tax magic to occur, there are several conditions
which must be satisfied. First, the trust must not be considered a
simple trust. In Revenue Ruling 67-74,26 it was held that where a
simple trust distributed appreciated property with a fair market
value equal to the income of the trust, such distribution resulted in
a recognition of income to the trust to the extent the fair market
value exceeded the trust's basis. Presumably, if such a distribution
is made with section 306 stock, the trust will recognize ordinary
income under section 306(a)(1). Making the trust a complex trust,
therefore, would presumably avoid the applicability of this revenue
ruling."
Second, the fair market value of the preferred stock distributed
should be equal to or less than the distributable net income of the
trust for the top year of the distribution. To the extent the distribu-
tion in kind is not included in the income of the beneficiary, he
21. Generally, the fair market value of a preferred stock received as a dividend on
common stock will exceed the basis allocated under § 307(a).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 661(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(2).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 662(b).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(3) (1956).
25. For a thorough explanation of this tax phenomenon, see M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND
& R. STEVENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES, 525-33 (1970).
26. 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 194.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-i (1956) defines a complex trust, in effect, as one which is
required to and does distribute amounts other than income during the taxable year.
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carries over the donor's basis. " Presumably this portion of the stock
will still have the section 306 taint.
While the Internal Revenue Service might argue against the
above results as violative of clearly determined congressional policy
under the step transaction doctrine," it is submitted that their argu-
ments should fail. While it is true that Congress did not intend to
create this loophole to remove the section 306 taint, the statute, and
the Treasury's Regulations under it, mandate this result. One must
take the statute as written, rather than as Congress might have
written it had it discerned the potential problems. This trust is not
a sham; that is, not created exclusively to hold the preferred stock
as the holding of appreciating property was also necessary. Further-
more, the trust bears a true market risk. There is no guarantee that
the potentially appreciable property will in fact appreciate or that
the grantor's closely held corporation will remain solvent. Nor is the
sale of the preferred stock prearranged. Thus, the typical character-
istics of a step transaction, that is, interdependent steps subject to
binding commitments, " are not present here.
There also exists the very viable possibility that the IRS would
fight such a mechanism on the basis that a distribution of stock
triggers a distribution of income. Such risks must, of course, be
weighed when deciding whether potential gains merit use of this
device.
In conclusion, the utilization of the Schnepper Trust in the
above situation might remove the section 306 taint on the preferred
stock, allow the shareholder through his son to take cash out of his
corporation at capital gain rates, and potentially allow a sheltering
of realized appreciation by the trust through a fair market value
step-up deduction by the trust. It is a valuable weapon which should
28. Rev. Rul. 64-314, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 167.
29. For a discussion of step transactions, see generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1-19 to 1-21 (1971); Comment, Step
Transactions, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 60 (1969).
30. See Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
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be considered by any tax advisor who services closely held corpora-
tions and their owners.3'
31. There are alternatives for removing the § 306 taint on the preferred stock outlined
in § 306(b). As none of these alternatives are applicable in the instant case, they will not be
discussed.
For a discussion of these alternatives, in depth analyses of § 306 and other ways to remove
the taint, see generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 10 (1971); Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs and the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 65 YALE L.J. 909 (1956); Dean, Rules Governing Preferred Stock Bail-Outs, 14
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 691 (1956); Kendal, Section 306 Stock: How to Remove the
"Taint" and Use It Effectively in Tax Planning, 24 J. TAX. 322 (1966); Lowe, Bailouts-Their
Role in Corporate Planning, 30 TAX. L. REv:357 (1975); Solomon, How to Deal With Section
306, 1968 So. CAL. TAX. INST. 167; Young, Preferred Stock Bail-Outs: Statutory Restrictions:
Pitfalls and Continuing Opportunities Under the 1954 Code (Section 306), 15 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX. 431 (1957).
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